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BOOK REVIEW
THE CONDOMINIA OF MORGAN: A FAMILY OF BANKERS
AND A FAMILY OF BANKS
MICHAEL P. MALLOY*
The House of Morgan, By R. Chernow. Atlantic Monthly Press, 1990.
Pp. 812. $14.95.
On page one of the business section of a recent issue of The New York
Times, we are told that J. P. Morgan & Company, holding company of
(among others) the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., has reported a record
quarterly profit, at a time when many other money center banks are suf-
fering substantial losses.I In the same issue, lower and to the right on the
same page, we are told that war-ravaged Kuwait2 has announced a plan
to borrow $5 billion, as the first phase in a loan program intended to
fund the rebuilding of the country.3 The Kuwaiti Ministry of Finance
appointed J. P. Morgan & Company to "coordinate" formation of a mul-
tinational group of lead managing banks for a syndicate expected ulti-
mately to number hundreds of participating banks.4 A London-based
Morgan spokesman is quoted in the article, referring to encouraging re-
sponses "from banks in Japan, Europe and North America."5 For com-
mentary on the likely success of this announced syndicate, in light of
competing demands on capital from such places as Eastern Europe and
Latin America, the article consults an analyst at Morgan Stanley & Com-
pany, the investment bank.6
These news items, in a nutshell, probably characterize with fair accu-
racy longstanding public perceptions of the Morgan dynasty: profitable,
impervious to adverse financial conditions, imperious with respect to
other banks, transnational in scope, well-connected, banker to govern-
ments. Mr. Ron Chernow's The House of Morgan7 does much to con-
firm this popular view, and also does a thorough job of illustrating the
historical and hard-won roots of that view.
* Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies, Fordham University School
of Law.
1. See Quint, J. P. Morgan Posts Record Earnings, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1991, at Dl,
col. 6.
2. On the background surrounding the invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces in August
1990, see Malloy, The Iraqi Sanctions: Something Old, Something New, 15 S. Il. U.L.J.
413, 414-17 (1991).
3. See Prokesch, Kuwait Seeks $5 Billion To Repair War Damage, N.Y. Times, Oct.
11, 1991, at D1, col. 4.
4. Id.
5. Id. (quoting John T. Hompe, Morgan spokesman).
6. See id. at DI, col. 5 (quoting Keith Brown, Morgan analyst).
7. R. Chernow, The House of Morgan: An American Banking Dynasty and the
Rise of Modem Finance (1990) [hereinafter House of Morgan].
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Mr. Chernow structures his study as an examination of the rise, fall
and resurrection of the "House of Morgan," yet his painstaking examina-
tion of the history of this institution does, to some extent, undermine this
literary architecture. For one thing, the reader will quickly discover that
it is only in the most general (and least interesting) sense that we can
speak of a "house" of Morgan at all. Rather, what we find are a series of
interrelated houses or, perhaps, condominia. These were eventually sep-
arated by the strictures of post-crash federal legislation," and it is only in
relatively recent times that the commercial banking firm has begun to
reemerge into the securities business again.9
Even at its height, virtually unrestricted in its activities by federal law,
the "house" was actually a family of houses, spanning the globe. The
family originated with expatriate American banker George Peabody's
London banking house, founded in 1838,10 inherited by the Morgans"
and eventually to become Morgan Grenfell. The enterprise expanded
into the United States with the founding of the Morgan partnership in
186112 in New York City, and flowered into a set of "interlocking part-
nerships" including Morgan Grenfell, Morgan et Compagnie in Paris
and Drexel and Company in Philadelphia.13
Despite the intricacies of the interlocking (and continually changing)
partnership structure of the houses of Morgan, in popular understand-
ing-as well as in the view of government investigators 4-the enterprise
was most frequently conceived of as a monolithic "Morgan," and to a
considerable extent was personified in the figure of J. P. Morgan. Ironi-
cally enough, this J. P. Morgan, a sort of living caricature of the figure of
the prosperous, influential banker, was itself an amalgam of two individ-
uals: J. P. Morgan, Sr. (1837-1913), "Pierpont," and J. P. Morgan, Jr.
(1867-1943), "Jack." It is this almost mythic personification of the Mor-
8. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 377, 378 (1988). This legislation, known collectively as the
Glass-Steagall Act, prohibited affiliation between commercial and investment banking en-
terprises and prohibited commercial and investment banking activities within one enter-
prise. On these restrictions, see generally 2 M. Malloy, The Corporate Law of Banks
§§ 7.2-7.2.5, at 551-93 (1988 & 1991 Cum. Supp. No. 1).
9. So, for example, in January 1989, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System ("the Fed") authorized a securities subsidiary of J. P. Morgan & Company to
engage, to a limited extent as specified in the Fed's order, in underwriting and dealing in
corporate debt securities. See J P. Morgan & Co., Inc., [1988-1989 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 87,554 (Jan. 19, 1989), modified, Order Approving Modifi-
cations to Section 20 Orders, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
87,803 (Sept. 21, 1989). In November 1989, the Fed authorized the securities subsidiary
to engage in private placements of all types of securities, including corporate equity. See
J. P. Morgan & Co., Inc., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
87,848 (Nov. 22, 1989). For a discussion of these and related orders issued by the Fed,
see 2 M. Malloy, supra note 8, § 7.3.1, at 336-39 (1991 Cum. Supp. No. 1).
10. See House of Morgan, supra note 7, at 4-5.
11. See id. at 9-15.
12. See id.
13. See id. at 33, 286.
14. For a discussion of the Pujo hearings into the "Money Trust," see House of Mor-
gan, supra note 7, at 149-56.
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gan banking combine that has probably caused the firm, and large money
center banks in general, so much trouble in the twentieth century history
of bank regulatory policy in the United States. Like the public at large,
U.S. policy makers (and especially Senators and Representatives) are
most comfortable with easily identified targets, rather than broader mar-
ket forces. "Morgan" has provided a convenient, simple-minded,
straightforward target.
Mr. Chernow's book is particularly useful in this regard, since it un-
packs, in great detail, the intricacies of the structure of the houses of
Morgan, discusses the power and limitations of this great financial com-
bine, and--despite a fascination with the individual personalities in-
volved, Morgan and non-Morgan-separates out the "personality" of the
enterprise from that of its key historical figures. This collective personal-
ity has its own interest for the reader, and Mr. Chernow is canny enough
to allow that to be exhibited.
Nevertheless, as with any popular history, the story is anchored
around a series of individual personalities, and Mr. Chernow shapes the
structure of his book around the succession of Morgan leaders. This
structure is evident from the overall, formal division of the book into
three parts. Part One, "The Baronial Age," covers the years 1838
through 1913, and focuses for the most part, as it must, on the career of
Pierpont Morgan.15 This was the great unbounded period of develop-
ment for the Morgan enterprise, but it culminated with the public outcry
against the trusts, and the tragedy of the Titanic, owned by a Morgan-
controlled trust, the International Mercantile Marine, in April 1912.16
(Pierpont, as well as Vivian Smith of Morgan Grenfell, both had booked
passage on the Titanic's fateful maiden voyage, but both cancelled.7)
Pierpont died the following year.
Part Two, "The Diplomatic Age," covers the years 1913 through
1948, more or less coincident with the years of Jack Morgan at the helm
of Morgan. Here the emphasis is upon the great international undertak-
ings of the enterprise: organizing the financing of two world wars, rene-
gotiating inter-war debt, 8 and the increasing role of the Morgan
enterprise as an intermediary between governments. 9 In the midst of
this age, of course, was to come the stock market crash of 1929, and the
subsequent depression. Here, the Morgan touch could not set things
right, as it apparently had during the earlier Panic of 1907,20 and an
almost biblical expulsion of commercial banks from investment banking
was to occur with the passage of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1933.2"
15. See id at 1-161.
16. See id. at 145-61.
17. See id. at 146.
18. See id. at 183-204.
19. See id at 205-29.
20. For a discussion of the Panic and the subsequent establishment of the Federal
Reserve System, see id. at 121-30.
21. See supra note 8.
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In terms of the personality of the Morgan enterprise, the Glass-Stea-
gall Act was perhaps singularly important. Among other things, the act
prohibited most banks from engaging directly in almost all types of se-
curities activities.22 In addition, the act prohibited the affiliation between
commercial and investment banking firms. 23 This legislative develop-
ment furthered the gradual disarticulation that was occurring in the
transnational Morgan enterprise,24 but the most wrenching change
wrought by the act was undoubtedly the separation of J. P. Morgan &
Company's U.S. commercial and investment banking operations. In
1935, the company decided to retain its commercial banking business,
and to spin off its investment banking activities into Morgan Stanley &
Company.25
Mr. Chernow tells this part of the Morgan story particularly well; hav-
ing imparted to the reader the personal relationship that Morgan part-
ners had with their enterprise, their forced divestiture of part of the
business was evidently an agonizing decision for those concerned. He
also suggests later in his book that the partners may have been mistaken,
in the long run, to stick with the commercial banking side of the busi-
ness, rather than partake of the financial glories of investment banking in
the 1980s.26 (The 1990s, with the attendant reversals of fortune among
investment banking firms, could alter that judgment.) He also suggests
that Morgan's perception of this mistake may in part explain the aggres-
sive stance of J. P. Morgan & Company in the fight to repeal Glass-
Steagall.27
The entire book is replete with vivid personalities, rendered to life in
character studies by the author. But Parts One and Two are anchored,
and organized, around the personalities of the two J. P. Morgans, father
and son. Part Three, "The Casino Age," covering the years 1948
22. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988) (prohibiting national banks from engag-
ing in most securities activities); 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1988) (imposing prohibitions of 12
U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988) on Fed-member banks); 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988) (prohibiting
all financial institutions from engaging directly in securities activities, except as permitted
by 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988)). For a general review of these restrictions, see 2 M.
Malloy, supra note 8, § 7.2.1, at 572-75. See also Fischer, Gram, Kaufman & Mote, The
Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 51 Tenn. L.
Rev. 467 (1984) (discussing need for congressional action to develop uniform policy re-
garding interpretation of Glass-Steagall Act); Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and
Investment Banking: A History, 88 Banking L.J. 483 (1971) (discussing relationship of
investment and commercial banking from turn of the century to passage of Glass-Steagall
Act in 1933).
23. See 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1988).
24. For example, the J. P. Morgan & Company stake in Morgan Grenfell & Company
Ltd. was reduced to one-third in 1934. See House of Morgan, supra note 7, at 385. This
stake was eventually sold in 1981-1982, see id. at 653-54, while Morgan Grenfell Incorpo-
rated, an investment banking subsidiary, would invade New York in 1981, see id. at 654.
Morgan Grenfell & Company Ltd. was eventually purchased by Deutsche Bank in 1989.
See id. at 715.
25. See id. at 384-88.
26. See id. at 715-16.
27. See id. at 716.
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through 1989, is relatively more diffuse, and no individual player held
this reader's attention as well as the two Morgans. It is as if events, both
significant and otherwise, now seize the initiative in the story of the
houses of Morgan. While this may be the freewheeling age of casino
players that Mr. Chernow seeks to convey, it lacks the vitality of those
two personalities. Yet this portion of the story is of considerable impor-
tance in its own right.
Among other things, the Morgan bank was institutionally displaced in
the post-World War II era. The "mysterious troika of the Bank of Eng-
land, the New York Fed, and Morgans"2 was eventually to be replaced
in the supervision of the international monetary system by the newly cre-
ated International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Re-
construction and Development.29 The U.S. Government renewed its
interest in trust-busting with a monumental antitrust suit in 1947 against
seventeen investment banks (including Morgan Stanley) and their trade
group, the Investment Bankers Association, for allegedly conspiring to
monopolize underwriting.30 In 1959, the Morgan bank merged with the
Guaranty Trust Company to become the Morgan Guaranty Trust Com-
pany,31 with a one-bank holding company known as J. P. Morgan &
Company, Inc., being created for the merged bank ten years later.32 In
the 1960s, with the rise of negotiable certificates of deposit and other
trading devices, the bank moved from its traditional wholesale and de-
posit bank orientation to the money-purchase business and trading.33
The bank was also enmeshed in the celebrated Texas Gulf Sulphur
controversy, 34 the dramatic enforcement push by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission into insider trading, that has had significant conse-
quences for banks with trust departments.35 It also weathered the
emerging, aggressive takeover market of the 1960s and the economic
28. Id. at 485.
29. See id. at 485-88.
30. See United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
31. See House of Morgan, supra note 7, at 531-34.
32. See id. at 591-92.
33. See id. at 539-40; see also id. at 653-70 (discussing Morgan's trading activity dur-
ing the 1980s).
34. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), remanded to
312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 446 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir.),
remanded to 331 F. Supp. 671 (S.D.N.Y.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971); see also
House of Morgan, supra note 7, at 562-67 (describing Texas Gulf'Sulphur controversy).
35. See, eg., 2 M. Malloy, supra note 8, § 7.3.3, at 614-15 (analyzing segregation of
trust activities and general banking activities as way of avoiding leakage of inside infor-
mation); Arnold, Guidelines for the Banker "Insider" or "Tippee". The Texas Gulf and
Merrill Lynch Decisions, 86 Banking L.J. 319 (1969) (offering provisional guidelines for
bank officials who are exposed to confidential corporate information); Bruzda & Seidel,
Bank Trust Departments and the J0b-5 Dilemma, 21 Vill. L. Rev. 367, 368 (1976) (dis-
cussing conflicting duties faced by bank's commercial and trust activites under Rule lOb-
5); Harfield, Texas Gulf Sulphur and Bank Internal Procedures Between the Trust and
Commercial Departments, 86 Banking L.J. 869 (1969) (arguing that Texas Gulf'Sulphur
decision did not contemplate full-service banks, which must exchange information be-
tween trust and commercial departments to fulfill fiduciary and legal duties).
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downturn and internationalization of oil-dependent economies in the
1970s.
The transformation of the houses of Morgan in the later part of the
twentieth century would appear to reflect a transformation of public in-
stitutions as well. As Mr. Chernow points out in the concluding passages
of his book, "The old House of Morgan's power stemmed from the im-
mature state of government treasuries, companies, and capital mar-
kets."36 That is to say, Morgan performed quasi-institutional or quasi-
governmental functions that could not or were not performed by public
entities, including monetary policy supervision and intervention, public
finance and development, and the like. As those functions have become
the province of national and international institutions, the older Morgan
legacy has necessarily been sloughed off in favor of a more aggressive
approach to the functions of financial intermediation that take place in a
radically more competitive and globalized environment. One merit of
Mr. Chernow's historical study is that it gives the reader a clear perspec-
tive on the ways in which the long historical legacy of the houses of Mor-
gan both aided and impeded the present day Morgan in meeting the
challenges of the contemporary business environment.
If there is any fault to be found in Mr. Chernow's book, it is primarily
the hazard of a popular history. In personalizing much of the history of
and surrounding the houses of Morgan, the author renders many of the
events into anecdotal evidence, seen typically from the particular per-
spective of the Morgan enterprise and its participants. The emergence of
the Glass-Steagall Act restrictions, for example, become a matter of per-
sonal discomfort and agonizing for the Morgan partners, but the reader
may lose some sense of the broader public policy purposes and perspec-
tives at work in the enactment of these restrictions. Similarly, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission's dramatic assault on insider trading
becomes almost no more than a painful tale of personal embarassment
for Morgan partners.
These are, however, not significant drawbacks in what is, primarily,
intended as a popular history of a remarkable banking enterprise. It suc-
ceeds in giving the reader a sense of the scope and risks of the ambitions
of the major participants involved in the history of this enterprise. It
conveys in straightforward and compelling terms the challenges and
achievements of this longstanding undertaking. Finally, it gives-dare
one say it?-a sense of romance and adventure to a peculiarly human
enterprise, the "augmentation of the active or productive capital of a
country," to use Hamilton's phrase.37 For this alone it is worth a thor-
ough reading.
36. House of Morgan, supra note 7, at 720.
37. 1 Am. St. Papers 67 (Treasury Report on a National Bank, Dec. 13, 1790).
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